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Abstract Over the past quarter century, the use of stock options as pay for performance
has grown enormously. Option grants now account for 32% of CEO pay—more than
twice that of salaries. In addition options are now being granted to many more employ-
ees than before. During this same time period, there have been numerous innovations
in the features on compensation options. One of these features is the reload—the grant
of new options to replace shares tendered in the payment of the exercise.
Within the past year, the long-delayed FASB requirement that options be expensed
for financial reporting has finally become a fact. It is incumbent upon financial re-
searchers to provide methods to achieve the goal of valuing options, not only to serve
the accounting needs, but also to provide ways of determining their true costs and
incentive effects.
This paper analyzes the various forms of reload options and provides simple Black-
Scholes like formulas for evaluating them.
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1 Valuing reload options
Stock options have been the fastest growing component of compensation for more than
two decades. According to Hall and Liebman (1998), 30% of CEOs received option
grants in 1980. By 1994, this had risen to 70%. The 2005 Mercer Compensation
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Survey reports this figure as now over 75%. Option grants now account for 32% of
CEO pay—more than double salaries.1
In the past few years the explosive growth of CEO options has slowed and even
slightly reversed, but now options are being granted to many more managers and
employees below the top tier. The 1999 Mercer Compensation Survey reported that
40% of large U.S. companies grant options to more than half their employees. The
most recent (2005) Mercer Survey reported that the number of options granted each
year amounted to more than 1% of the outstanding shares and the option overhang (the
possible shareholder dilution if all outstanding compensation options were exercised)
had grown to 13.6%. In some industries, like IT, it is much higher.
Now that the FASB requires the expensing of compensatory options, it is more
important than ever to be able to accurately assess the true cost of this compensation.2
Unfortunately, along with the growth of the use of options have come innovations in
the compensation contract that hinder their easy valuation. One of the more recent
innovations is the reload option (also called a restoration, replacement, or accelerated
ownership option).
A reload feature on an option automatically grants new options whenever the orig-
inal option is exercised using previously owned shares to “pay” the exercise price.3
The stated purpose of reloads is to maintain the employee’s ownership position. If four
shares are surrendered to exercise five options, then by granting four new options, the
nine “share” position is maintained—four shares and five options prior to exercise
versus five shares and four options after the reload.
The first reload option was designed in 1987 by Frederic W, Cook and Co. for
Norwest Corporation.4 Since then, the popularity of the reload feature has been steadily
increasing. The Standard and Poor’s Execucomp Database reports that the options
granted as second generation options under a reload provision as a fraction of all
option grants rose from 5.5% in 1992 to 11.7% in 1997.5
Clearly, a reload option is more valuable than an ordinary option without this
feature. Estimating this extra value has been a concern in the accounting industry. In
1995, the FASB recommended:
Because a reload feature is part of the option initially awarded, the Board
believes that the value added to those options by the reload feature ideally
should be considered in estimating the fair value of the award on the grant date.
1 2005 CEO Compensation Survey and Trends by Mercer Human Resource Consulting. Option are valued
using the Black-Scholes model as of the time of grant.
2 FASB123(R) requires the expensing of options for public companies starting with fiscal years that com-
menced after June 15, 2005. The Bear Stearns report cited in Carter et al. (2006) lists 824 firms, mostly
financial institutions, that are already voluntarily doing so.
3 Reloading should not be confused with “stock exercise” or “cashless exercise” of options. The latter
practice permits using already owned stock to be used to pay the exercise price, but it does not grant new
options.
4 See Gay (1999).
5 First-generation reload options are not reported separately from conventional options; therefore, the
number of options with the reload feature cannot be determined precisely. The Investor Responsibility
Research Center reports that reload features were included in 17% of new stock option plans in 1997.
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However, the Board understands that no reasonable method currently exists to
estimate the value added by the reload feature.
Accordingly, the Board concluded that the best way to account for an option
with a reload feature is to treat both the initial grant and each subsequent grant
of a reload option separately.
(Statement of the Financial Accounting Standards Board No. 123, ¶ 183 and
186)
Treating each reload as a new grant, as suggested by the FASB, could substantially
overstate the value of reload options. Reload options are designed to be exercised
before maturity so valuing them as a series of regular options all maturing on the
original exercise date will assign too high a value. Nor will the common practice of
using the average realized life in place of the time to maturity correct this problem.
Shortly after publication of this opinion, numerical methods such as the binomial
model were proposed to value reload options.6 Further research by Hemmer et al.
(1998) and Dybvig and Lowenstein (2003) has characterized the optimal policies and
given formal (integral) valuations to these options. However, a simple formula akin to
Black-Scholes has not been available.
Even though these options have American-style exercise, this paper derives analyt-
ical solutions for unrestricted reload options (those that can be reloaded any number
of times), level-restricted reloads (those that must be in-the-money by a given amount
before they can be reloaded), and reload options subject to vesting. The formulas cover
all three cases of regular, tax, and one-for-one reloads. Approximate values including
upper and lower bounds for other types of reload options are also derived.
Section 2 discusses some common features of reload options. Section 3 gives some
preliminary pricing results. Section 4 derives the formulas in a Black-Scholes context.
Section 5 analyzes the subjective value of reload options and discusses their incentive
effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Common features of reload options
The reload feature automatically grants new options when existing options are exer-
cised by tendering previously owned shares to “pay” the exercise price. In some cases,
these shares must have been held for a specified period of time before they can be
used.7 In other cases, the shares received are also subject to some minimum holding
period. Most companies that offer reload options extend the reload to all employees.8
6 See Hemmer et al. (1998), Jagannathan and Saly (1998) and Saly et al. (1999). Johnson and Tian (2000)
give a formula for reload options, but it is for options that can be reloaded only once on a specified date. I
know of no plans with this particular restriction.
7 A six-month holding period is required for the tendered shares to avoid the necessity of “variable”
accounting treatment that would require the company to report a compensation expense equal to the increases
in the price of the stock. This holding-period requirement does not affect the valuation only the accounting
treatment. Individual plans can, of course, adopt more stringent rules. In addition no gain is realized on
the tendered shares; some of the new shares simply inherit their cost basis. This means the employee is
indifferent about which shares are tendered.
8 See Frederic W. Cook & Co. (1998). All descriptive data about frequency of plan types and options in
this section comes from this survey.
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Other features can also vary from plan to plan. The primary difference amongst plans
is in the number of new options granted. The three most common types of reloads
are the regular (or stock-for-stock) reload, the tax reload, and the one-for-one (or total
exercise) reload.
With a regular reload, the number of new options granted is equal to the number of
shares needed to pay the strike price using the stock at its current value. For example,
if 2000 first generation options with a strike price of $60 are exercised when the
stock price is $75, then the 2000 × $60 = $120,000 strike payment can be paid with
120,000/75 = 1600 shares. In this case, 1600 second-generation options each with
a strike of $75 will be granted. The Cook survey found that 40% of the firms using
reload options had regular reloads like this.
Norwest and some other corporations grant new options equal to the number of
shares tendered to pay both the exercise price and the tax withheld on the difference
between the stock price and the exercise price. If the options are not qualified as
incentive stock options (NQSOs), then the amount by which they are in-the-money
is taxable income upon exercise. In this example, there is taxable income of 2000
×(75 − 60) = $30,000. The required withholding rate for income recognized from
the exercise of NQSOs is 27.5% so the required withholding tax is $8250.9 If the
plan allows, 8250/75 = 110 additional shares can be tendered to pay the withholding
tax, then a total of 1710 second-generation options each with a strike of $75 will be
granted. Tax reloads like this are used by 52% of the companies using reload options.
There are no other tax consequences of a reload since capital gains are not realized
on the shares tendered in the exchange. With a regular reload option, the cost basis
for 1600 of the shares inherits the basis of the “swapped” shares. The cost basis of
the remaining 400 new shares is $75 per share (the prevailing market price). With
a tax-reload option, the cost basis for 1710 of the shares inherits the basis of the
“swapped” shares. The cost basis of the remaining 290 new shares is again $75 per
share. Therefore, the total extra benefit of the reload feature compared to a regular
exercise (both before and after taxes) is simply the value of the additional 1600 (or
1710) at-the-money options received.
A very few plans have a one-for-one option reload; that is, one new option is granted
for each option exercised rather than for each share tendered. In the example above,
when the 2000 options are exercised at a stock price of $75, 2000 new options each
with a strike of $75 are issued. One-for-one reload options are substantially more
valuable than regular reloads since more options are always exercised than shares are
tendered. One-for-one reloads are found in 8% of plans.
The other major difference among plans is the number of reloads permitted. Nor-
west’s plan issues ordinary second-generation options in the reload; thus limiting the
number of reloads to one. At the opposite extreme, First Chicago puts no limit on
the number of times an option can be reloaded—each second, third, and succeeding
9 This is the withholding rate effective August 6, 2001 per IRS publication 15-T. If the stock acquired in
the exercise of a NQSO is not transferable and subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then the tax is
deferred until such time that one of these conditions is not met. This deferral is covered by U.S. Treasury
Regulations 1.83-3(d) and 1.83-3(c). It would most commonly apply when the stock is not vested and would
be surrendered to the company after voluntary separation. It also applies if the employee holds 10% or more
of the company’s common stock and is restricted from selling it under the “short-swing” rule of Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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generation option is itself a reload option. Other plans use other limits. For example,
First Bank System permits up to three reloads. TIG Holdings limits employees to
two reloads in any calendar year. The Cook survey reports that only one third of the
companies using reloads had such limits—usually a single reload.
In some plans, the number of reloads is indirectly limited by a new vesting require-
ment, requiring a holding period before they can be reloaded again, or by requiring
that the option to be in-the-money by a certain amount before it can be reloaded. If
the later generation options do not vest immediately or have a holding period, then
there is an implicit limit on the number of reloads. For example, if each generation
had a two-year vesting period, then only four reloads (plus a final regular exercise
at maturity) could be fit into the usual ten-year life of the option. If options must
be in-the-money by a certain minimum amount to be reloaded, then the number of
reloads has an endogenous limitation. In the Cook survey only one firm had a holding
period limitation while one quarter of the firms had a price limit. The largest and near
universal in-the-money limitation when one existed was a 25% appreciation. Most
firms had some vesting requirement for the new shares, but these were very short.
Immediate vesting was granted by 35% of firms and an additional 33% vested after
6 months. Over 90% of firms vested the later generation options within one year of
their grant.
Under current rules, any second or later generation options must expire no later
than the date when the first-generation option would have expired, and, for all plans
that I am aware of, later generation options do expire on this last possible date. Prior to
1995, the later generation options could have up to ten year maturities from the time
of grant. Travelers Group Inc. was one company which made use of this provision.
Since the later generation options were also reloads, under the original plan the reload
option and its offspring could have existed forever, albeit in smaller and smaller
amounts.10
These different features affect the value, delta, and the optimal exercise policy
for reload options. Clearly the more options granted in a reload and the more often
reloading is allowed, the higher will be the value of the option. Reloading for taxes
paid or granting longer maturities on the reloaded options also gives a higher value.
The exact amount of this additional value depends on the provisions of the contract
and the parameters like volatility affecting value.
3 Valuing reload options: Preliminary considerations
The payoff of a series of generations of reload options is path-dependent—depending
on the stock prices at all the exercise points. This dependence makes the valuation
problem a difficult multivariate one. In addition, of course, we must determine the
optimal exercise policy as with American options.
10 Under plans like the Travelers Group’s, it can also pay to exercise expiring reload options when they are
out-of-the-money. For example, suppose an option with a strike of $50 were expiring when the stock price
was $40, then exercising would require giving up 125 shares to exercise 100 options (receive 100 shares);
however, 125 new ten-year option would also be received. This would be worthwhile if each option were
worth more than $8, as would be the case for realistic parameter values.
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Let the various exercise/reload dates and the maturity be denoted by t1, t2, . . . , tM ,
and T . The stock prices on these dates are S1, S2, . . . , SM , and ST . Note that these
exercise dates themselves are random as well as the prices. The strike price at the first
exercise is X. The strike price at the m + 1st exercise is the stock price at the previous
exercise date, Sm . Since only in-the-money options should be exercised, the stock price
at each successive exercise and reload is higher, S0 < S1 < S2 < · · · < SM−1 < SM .
Also if an exercise occurs at maturity, then SM < ST . The number of reloads, M , is a
random variable even if the maximum number of reloads permitted is limited since the
option will not be exercised when it is out-of-the-money, and some of the permitted
reloads may not be used. The maximum number of reloads simply bounds M . If the
number of reloads is unlimited, then M could be infinite in a continuous-time model.
For each reload option held initially, the employee receives a series of payoffs of
S1 − X, n1(S2 − S1), . . . , nM−1(SM − SM−1), nM · Max(ST − SM , 0) where ni is the
number of options received in the i th reload. With a one-for-one reload, the employee
always has one option, 1 = n1 = n2 = . . . . With a regular or tax reload option, the
employee owns fewer options after each reload, 1 > n1 > n2 > . . . .
Consider an employee who initially owns one reload option. At the first exercise,
one share is purchased with the option by using X/S1 shares to pay the strike price.11
This gives a payoff of S1 − X . The tendered shares are replaced by n1 = X/S1
second-generation options each with a strike of S1. At the second exercise date,
n1 options are exercised by tendering n1 × S1/S2 = X/S2 shares. The payoff is
n1(S2 − S1), and X/S2 new options are received. Continuing, we see that after the
mth reload, the employee holds nm = X/Sm options each with a strike price of Sm so
the holding and payoff are path-dependent; but only insofar as the stock price at the
most recent exercise affects them.
With the tax-reload option, in addition to the Sm−1/Sm shares tendered to pay the
strike price, Sm−1, on each option held, the withholding tax of τ (Sm − Sm−1) can also
be paid with an additional τ (Sm − Sm−1)/Sm shares. Therefore, for each option held
before exercise, there are τ + (1 − τ )(Sm−1/Sm) options after the exercise.
Figure 1 shows a sample history for a reload option. The original strike price is
50. The first-generation option is exercised after five months when the stock price is
65. The second-generation options are exercised after two years and nine months at
a stock price of 85. The third-generation options are exercised during the fifth month
of the fourth year at a stock price of 110. The last option expires out-of-the-money.
If the option is a one-for-one reload, the payoffs are 15, 20, and 25 at the three
exercises. Since the third-generation option expires out-of-the-money, there is no
final payoff.
With a regular reload, 50/65 = 0.769 shares are tendered to pay the first exercise.
These shares are replaced by 0.769 options. These 0.769 second-generation options
are exercised at a by tendering 0.769 × 65/85 = 0.588 shares. Afterwards 0.588
options are held. At the third exercise, the 0.588 third-generation options are exercised
11 We assume that the shares tendered in payment are infinitely divisible and that fractional options are
granted in a reload. Relaxing this assumption to require tendering a whole number of shares is discussed in
Section 4.3 below. For option grants of typical size, the assumption that shares are infinitely divisible has
no material effect on the value of any reload option.
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Fig. 1 Exercise and replicating portfolio history for a reload option. (This figure illustrates a sample price
history for a share of stock and the exercises of a reload option with an original strike price of $50. The options
are first exercised when the stock price reaches $65 by tendering 50/65 shares per option and receiving the
same number of new options each with a strike of $65 per share. The new options are exercised when the
stock price reaches $85 by tendering 65/85 shares per option or 50/65 · 65/85 = 50/85 shares per original
option and receiving that many new options each with a strike price of $85 per share. These options are
exercised at a stock price of $110 by tendering 85/110 shares per option or 50/110 shares per original option)
by tendering 0.588 × 85/110 = 0.455 shares. The payoffs are 15, 0.769 · 20 = 15.38,
and 0.588 · 25 = 14.70.
With a tax-reload option and a statutory withholding rate of 27.5%, the tax withheld
on the first exercise is 0.275 · (65 − 50) = 4.125. Therefore, an additional 4.125/65 =
0.063 shares are tendered to pay the withholding tax. 0.769 + 0.063 = 0.833 options
are received to replace the shares. At the second exercise, 0.833 × 65/85 = 0.637
and 0.833 × 0.275 × 20/85 = 0.054 shares are tendered to pay the exercise price
and withholding tax on the 0.833 options. 0.637 + 0.054 = 0.691 new options are
received. At the third exercise, 0.691 × 55/110 = 0.534 and 0.691 × 0.275 × 25/110
= 0.043 shares are tendered to pay the exercise price and withholding tax on the 0.691
options. The payoffs are 15, 0.833 · 20 = 16.65, and 0.691 · 25 = 17.27.
Valuing the various reload options requires discounting all of the relevant payoffs.
To determine the market value of each type of option, we discount the risk-neutral
expected payoffs at the interest rate or






e−r (t̃m−t)ñm−1(S̃m − S̃m−1)
]
+ e−r (T −t)Ê[ñM Max(S̃T − S̃M , 0)]}
where ñm ≡
⎧⎨⎩
1 for one-for-one reload options
X/S̃m for regular reload options
ñm−1[τ + (1 − τ )(S̃m−1/S̃m)] for tax-reload options
(1)
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n0 ≡ 1, S0 ≡ X,12 and Ê denotes the risk-neutral expectation. Note that the number
and timing of the reloads is random so the first expectation is over the distribution of
the tm’s as well as the stock prices on the exercise dates and both expectations are over
the distribution of the number of reloads, M . The maximization is done to choose that
policy which gives the largest expected discounted value.
The difference between the three types of reloads is due only to the number of new
options awarded and then exercised at each time. From the definition of ñm , the three
problems can be characterized by a single rule
ñm ≡ ñm−1[θ + (1 − θ )(S̃m−1/S̃m)] (2)
where θ = 0, τ , and 1, for the regular, tax, and one-for-one reloads respectively. Valu-
ing the reload option now only requires determining the exercise policy (and thereby
Sm , tm,and M) and actually computing the required expectations.
This problem would appear formidable; however, Hemmer et al. (1998) have shown
that the optimal policy for an unrestricted reload option is to exercise immediately and
repeatedly whenever the stock price rises above the current strike price even by a tiny
amount.13 Although they only discuss regular unrestricted reload options, this policy
is also optimal for unrestricted one-for-one reloads and unrestricted tax-reloads. In
each case the basic intuition is the same. Since one-for-one and unrestricted tax-
reloads grant more options in each exercise than do regular reloads, each exercise is
more valuable and should be done no later than for regular reloads. Of course, exercise
cannot be sooner than immediately when in-the-money so immediate exercise remains
the optimal policy.
When the number of reloads is implicitly limited, for example, by an in-the-
money or vesting restriction, then the reload should generally be exercised as soon
as the option is in-the-money after the restriction is no longer binding. When the
number of reloads is explicitly limited, exercising as soon as the stock exceeds
its previous maximum by a tiny amount is not optimal since wasting a reload on
a marginally in-the-money option has negligible benefit. Both types of restricted
reloads will be discussed later, and in the latter case, the optimal exercise pol-
icy will have to be determined as a part of the pricing problem as with American
puts.
One final issue remains—what value are we to determine? Reload options, like
all other incentive options, are nontransferable; therefore, their market price is of
only incidental interest. Two other values are important. The first is the subjective
value. This is the option’s value to the employee taking into consideration the ef-
fect of the extra idiosyncratic risk he is forced to bear due to all his compensation
12 Generally the strike price of an incentive option is set equal to the stock price at the time of the original
grant. Here S0 refers to the original strike price even if it is not the initial stock price.
13 It is common practice in option valuation to assume optimal exercise policies by the holder. This assump-
tion may be more troublesome here where the optimal policy requires not a single exercise but continuous
exercise (while the stock price is rising). In all case, the value under the optimal policy provides an upper
bound to the value under more practical policies. As shown below in Section 4.2, there is only a minor




that is tied to his company’s performance. The second value is the objective cost.
This is the present value of the option’s liability to the issuing corporation. The com-
pany’s shareholders do not experience the reduction in value due to the employee’s
under-diversified portfolio. However, as shown in Ingersoll (2006), for regular op-
tions, the employee’s optimal (subjective) exercise policy is objectively suboptimal—
the options are exercised at too low a stock price. This suboptimal exercise reduces
the objective cost of the option. With most reload options, this is not the case. Un-
restricted, vesting-restricted, and level-restricted reload options are optimally exer-
cised as soon as possible when they are in-the-money. Since they cannot be exercised
any sooner, the optimal subjective and optimal objective policies match and, there-
fore, their objective values are equal to the values they would have if they were
marketable.
The next section derives the market price of the various reloads under Black-Scholes
conditions. As just discussed these are also the objective values for all but the limited
reload options. The subjective values of the options and the objective values of the
limited reloads are determined in Section 5.
4 Pricing reload options in a Black-Scholes environment
In all our pricing models we adopt the usual Black-Scholes assumptions. In partic-
ular, the price of the stock follows a lognormal diffusion with a constant volatility,
σ , and a continuous dividend paid at a constant rate, q. The evolution of the stock
price is
d S = (μ − q)S dt + σ S dω. (3)
There are no transactions costs or other market frictions to restrict the formation or
costless rebalancing of the replicating portfolio. We determine the no-arbitrage market
price for these options ignoring for the moment any subjective considerations of an
under-diversified employee holding these options. Subjective valuation is discussed in
Section 5. The no-arbitrage price is the sum of risk-neutral expected payoffs discounted
at the interest rate.
We already know the optimal policy is to exercise unrestricted reloads as soon as
they are in-the-money; this means that the options will be exercised continuously as
the stock price rises. Nevertheless, it will be convenient to consider discrete exercise
steps. This will be useful when valuing restricted reload options later, so we use it here
as well to simplify the explanation of the valuation method
We begin with the assumption that the successive generations of reload options will
be exercised at known price levels, K1 < K2 < K3 < . . . . That is, the original option
is exercised the first time the stock price rises to K1; the second-generation option
is exercised the first time the stock price rises to K2; etc. With this assumption, the
successive exercise points and payoffs can all be determined ex ante. Only the time of
each payoff (including whether it occurs at all) is random. The payoff from each of
the options in the mth exercise is Km− Km−1. (We define K0 ≡ X .) The present value
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of this fixed payoff occurring at a random time is
PV[option payoff in mth exercise] = (Km − Km−1)T (S, t ; T ; Km)
where T (S, t ; T ; k) ≡ (k/S)b−β · (d+k ) + (k/S)b+β · (d−k ) (4)
with d±k ≡
ln(S/k) ± βσ 2(T − t)
σ
√







b2 + 2r/σ 2.
T (S, t ; T ; k) is the value of a first-touch digital at time t when the stock price of S.
This first-touch digital is a contract that pays $1 dollar the first time (before expiration
at time T ) that the stock price reaches the level, k.14
At maturity, if there have been exactly m reloads, each remaining option can be
exercised for Max(ST − Km , 0). The present value of this exercise is
S(S, t ; T ; {ST > Km} & {Smax < Km+1})−KmD(S, t ; T ; {ST > Km} & {Smax < Km+1})
where D (S, t ; T ; {ST > x} & {Smax < K }) = e−rT
(
(h−S/x ) − (h−S/K )
+ (K/S)2b[(h−K 2/Sx ) − (h−K/S)]
)
S (S, t ; T ; {ST > x} & {Smax < K }) = Se−qT
(
(h+S/x ) − (h+S/K ) (5)
+ (K/S)2b+2[(h+K 2/Sx ) − (h+K/S)]
)
h±z ≡













S(S, t ; T ; E) and D(S, t ; T ; E) are the values of a digital share and a digital option.
These are contracts that, at time T , convert to one share or pay $1, respectively, if
the event E has occurred. If the event E has not occurred, then the digital contracts
expire worthless. In this case, the stock price has never exceeded Km+1 so the m + 1st
exercise has not occurred; however, ST > Km , so the mth reload has occurred and this
last option expired in-the-money.
The value of the original reload option is the sum of these payoff values
R(S, t ; T, X ) =
∑
m=1
nm−1(Km − Km−1)T (S, t ; T, Km) +
∑
m=0
nm[S(S, t ; T ; Em)
−KmD(S, t ; T ; Em)]
where Em ≡ {ST > Km} &
{
Smax(0,T ) < Km+1
}
(6)
n0 = 1 nm ≡
⎧⎨⎩ X/Km for regular reload optionsnm−1[τ + (1 − τ )(Km−1/Km)] for tax reload options
1 for one-for-one reload options.




Equation (6) is a specific implementation of the more general Eq. (1). Equation (6)
does not have the maximization operator because the exercise policy is pre-specified
by the series of exercise points Km . This policy also determines the number of options
exercised at level. The digital values, T , S, and D handle the expectations over the
timing of the exercises and final stock price and the discounting. The second sum is
the present value of the payoff at maturity with the contribution to value from each
possible number of reloads determined separately and then summed. That is, the mth
term is the present value of getting nm(ST − Sm) at maturity if exactly m reloads have
occurred and the m + 1st generation option expires in-the-money. Note that for any
realization, only one of the events Em can occur, but we must sum over all possibilities.
Using Eq. (6) and various restrictions on the series of exercise points, most types
of reload options found in practice can be valued. In each of the next subsections we
examine one type.
4.1 Unrestricted reload options
The optimal exercise policy for an unrestricted reload option is to exercise whenever
the stock price rises above the current strike price even by a tiny amount. This is true
whether the option has a regular, one-for-one, or tax-reload feature. These options can
therefore be valued by setting Km+1 and Km arbitrarily close together and having no
limit on the number of reloads. Under this policy, the option is exercised and reloaded
whenever the stock price reaches a new high. The last reloading exercise occurs at the
maximum stock price reached during the option’s life so the final option must expire
out-of-the-money. This means the second sum in (6) can be ignored for unrestricted
reload options. In the limit, the first sum becomes an integral with Km+1 − Km → dK,
so the value of an unrestricted reload option can be written as
RUnrestricted(S, t ; T, X ) =
∫ ∞
X
n(K )T (S, t ; T, K ) d K . (7)
The difference between the three option types comes from the varying number of
options received in each reload as given in (6). For a regular unrestricted reload option,
n(K ) = X/K .With a one-for-one reload option, each exercised option is replaced by
a new one, and n(K ) = 1 for all exercises. With a tax-reload feature, the number of
options after each exercise and reload is nm = nm−1[τ + (1 − τ )(Km−1/Km)]. An








= −(1 − τ )d K
K
. (8)
Integrating (8) from one option initially; i.e., n(X ) = 1, gives n(K ) = (X/K )1−τ where
K is the highest stock price so far achieved.15 A grant of N options will, of course, be
N times as large.
15 Since the number of options changes only when the stock price rises, the derivative in (8) is an ordinary
derivative over the domain of the stock price. It is not an Ito derivative over the stock price path.
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Fig. 2 Values of reload and ordinary options against stock price. (This graph plots the values of ordinary
options and regular, tax and one-for-one reload options against the price of the underlying stock. The
parameters used are strike price: $100, time to maturity: 10 years, logarithmic volatility: 25%, dividend
yield: 2%, default-free interest rate: 5%, and withholding tax rate: 27.5%)
The three option types can be conveniently be represented by the single parameter
θ , with n(K ) = (X/K )1−θ where θ = 0, 1, τ for regular, one-for-one, and tax reload
options, respectively. The integral in (7) is evaluated for these three cases in the
Appendix where the formula for the reload options is derived as16
Rθ (S, t ; T, X ) =
∫ ∞
X
(X/K )1−θT (S, t ; T, K ) d K
= X



















r − θ[r − q + 1
2





θσ 2)(T − t)
)1 − θ
× (h−S/X + θσ√T − t)
where d±x , h
±
x , b, and β are defined in (4) and (5).
Figures 2 and 3 compare the values of reload to other options, and Table 1 shows
the values for representative parameters. It also gives the percentage premium relative
to a regular American option.17 The table illustrates that many of the properties of
reload options are similar to those of regular options. The delta is positive, of course,
and the value is increasing in the time to maturity. However, the percentage premium
over an ordinary option value is decreasing in the time to maturity. The premium is
16 For q = 0, the formula in Eq. (9) for a one-for-one option is given by L’Hospital’s rule as
R1−1(S, t ; T, X ; q = 0) = Sσ
√
T − t[d+X (d+X ) + φ(d+X )] −
σ 2
2r + σ 2 [(X/S)
2r/σ 2 X(d−X ) − S(h+S/X)].
17 American option values are computed with the barrier approximation in Ingersoll (1998).
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Table 1 Values of regular reload options
σ = 25% q = 0 σ = 25% q = 2%
Value of reload option RUnr(S, t; X, T)
X = X =
T − t 100 110 125 T − t 100 110 125
2 29.13 22.64 15.10 2 27.18 20.63 13.31
4 40.92 35.33 28.12 4 37.16 31.33 24.13
6 49.47 44.62 38.10 6 44.06 38.80 32.08
8 56.23 52.00 46.17 8 49.31 44.51 38.26
10 61.79 58.07 52.88 10 53.48 49.07 43.25
Percentage premium above regular option: (R − XAm)/XAm
X = X =
T − t 100 110 125 T − t 100 110 125
2 56.2% 59.1% 62.7% 2 69.1% 71.0% 73.4%
4 44.1% 46.4% 49.4% 4 62.1% 63.5% 65.2%
6 36.4% 38.4% 40.9% 6 58.4% 59.4% 60.8%
8 30.9% 32.6% 34.8% 8 56.2% 56.9% 58.0%
10 26.7% 28.1% 30.1% 10 54.7% 55.2% 56.1%
σ = 40% q = 0 σ = 40% q = 2%
Value of reload option RUnr (S, t; X, T)
X = X =
T − t 100 110 125 T − t 100 110 125
2 40.90 35.36 28.33 2 39.14 33.48 26.45
4 54.59 50.24 44.40 4 51.34 46.74 40.70
6 63.61 60.09 55.25 6 59.07 55.17 49.96
8 70.20 67.30 63.26 8 64.55 61.15 56.58
10 75.26 72.84 69.45 10 68.63 65.63 61.56
Percentage premium above regular option: (R − XAm)/XAm
X = X =
T − t 100 110 125 T − t 100 110 125
2 55.6% 57.5% 59.9% 2 65.1% 66.5% 68.3%
4 43.1% 44.6% 46.6% 4 56.7% 57.8% 59.1%
6 35.2% 36.5% 38.2% 6 51.9% 52.7% 53.8%
8 29.5% 30.6% 32.1% 8 48.6% 49.3% 50.2%
10 25.1% 26.1% 27.4% 10 46.3% 46.8% 47.6%
Table gives the values of regular reload options under the optimal unrestricted exercise policy. The percent-
age by which the values exceed those of regular American options are also given. The parameters used are
stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100, 110, 125; time to maturity: T − t = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10; logarithmic
volatility: σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free interest rate: r = 5%
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Fig. 3 Values of reload and ordinary options against time to maturity. (This graph plots the values of
ordinary options and regular, tax and one-for-one reload options against the time to maturity of the option.
The parameters used are stock price and strike price: $100, logarithmic volatility: 25%, dividend yield: 2%,
default-free interest rate: 5%, and withholding tax rate: 27.5%)
limited because the reload option, like the regular option, can be no more valuable than
a share of stock and even long-term regular options have values that are a substantial
fraction of the stock price. Nevertheless, even for ten-year maturities, which is typical
for compensation options, the reload feature adds 25 to 50% to the option’s value
depending on the volatility.
Out-of-the-money reload options are worth less than at-the-money reload options,
but the percentage premium is about constant. For example a six-year at-the-money
reload option is worth 36.4% more than a regular option with σ = 25% and r = 5%, but
if it is 10 or 25% out-of-the-money it is worth 38.4 or 40.9% more than a regular option.
When the option is out-of-the-money its value derives from the discounted expectation
of its payoff when in the money. So the effect of moneyness depends only on whether
the stock price rises above the strike, and this is the same for all types of options.18
Although dividends decrease the value of reload options just as they do for regular
options, their effect is much smaller on reload options, and the percentage reload pre-
mium is increasing in the dividend yield. That is, dividends depress the values of regular
options more than they do reload options. A ten-year reload option is about 25% more
valuable than a regular option when the stock is not paying dividends. At a dividend
18 In particular, we can write the value of an out-of-the-money option as C(S, t ; X, T ) =
Ê[e−r (t̃−t)C(X, t̃ ; X, T )] where t̃ is the random time until the stock price first gets to X and the option
is at-the-money. This is true for regular options and all kinds of reload options. The distribution of t̃, the
time until the option is at-the-money, depends only on the stock-price process so it is the same for all types
of options. Therefore, the reload premium is insensitive to the degree of moneyness depending only on the




yield of 2%, the percentage premium rises to about 50%. The reason dividends have a
smaller effect on reload options than regular options is simple. Exercising and reloading
gives the option holder a portion of the dividends that are missed with regular options.
The volatility sensitivity (vega) of a reload options is positive as with an ordi-
nary option, but the percentage premium is approximately constant regardless of the
volatility. Though not shown here, the interest rate sensitivity (rho) is also positive.
Table 2 shows the value of regular, one-for-one, and tax-reload options for repre-
sentative parameters. Again it also gives the percentage premium relative to a regular
American option. The tax reload feature makes the premium relative to an American
option about twice as large. One-for-one options are two to three times as valuable as
American options and are close to twice as valuable as a regular reload option.
4.2 Options with level-restricted reloads
About one quarter of reload options have restrictions permitting a reload only if they are
in-the-money by at least a specified percentage or dollar amount at the time of exercise.
Most commonly this in-the-money restriction is 25%. Reloads on later-generation
options are similarly restricted usually at the same percentage or dollar amount. For
example, suppose an option with a strike of $40 has a restriction preventing reload
unless it is 25% in-the-money. Although it can be exercised at any price, it cannot be
exercised with a reload until the stock price hits $50. If this is done, the next reload
Table 2 Values of regular, one-for-one, and tax reload options
σ = 25% q = 0 σ = 25% q = 2% σ = 40% q = 0 σ = 40% q = 2%
% Premium % Premium % Premium % Premium
Value over Amer. Value over Amer. Value over Amer. Value over Amer.
X = 100
European 48.78 33.98 60.16 45.13
American 48.78 34.58 60.16 46.92
Regular 61.79 26.7% 53.48 54.7% 75.26 25.1% 68.63 46.3%
1-for-1 114.26 134.2% 92.32 167.0% 182.24 202.9% 155.33 231.1%
Tax reload 71.50 46.6% 60.94 76.2% 91.41 52.0% 82.21 75.2%
X = 110
European 45.33 31.13 57.78 43.11
American 45.33 31.61 57.78 44.69
Regular 58.07 28.1% 49.07 55.2% 72.84 26.1% 65.63 46.8%
1-for-1 104.83 131.3% 83.02 162.7% 173.35 200.0% 145.93 226.5%
Tax reload 66.84 47.5% 55.67 76.1% 88.14 52.5% 78.35 75.3%
X = 125
European 40.66 27.37 54.52 40.37
American 40.66 27.71 54.52 41.71
Regular 52.88 30.1% 43.25 56.1% 69.44 27.4% 61.56 47.6%
1-for-1 92.54 127.6% 71.30 157.3% 160.84 195.0% 133.73 220.6%
Tax reload 60.46 48.7% 48.79 76.1% 83.61 53.3% 73.17 75.5%
Table gives the values of regular, one-for-one, and tax reload options under the optimal unrestricted exercise
policy. The percentage by which the values exceed those of regular American options are also given. The
parameters used are stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100, 110, 125; time to maturity: T − t = 10;
logarithmic volatility: σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free interest rate: r = 5%;
withholding tax rate: τ = 27.5%.
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cannot occur until the stock price reaches 25% above $50 or $62.50.19 An option with
a $10 in-the-money restriction and an initial strike price of $40 could be reloaded at
$50, then $60 (assuming the first reload occurred at exactly $50), etc.
To value a level-restricted reload option, we must first determine the optimal exer-
cise policy. An obvious guess would be that the option should always be exercised as
soon as possible just like an unrestricted reload option. Typically this is true, but two
circumstances might keep this policy from being optimal. First, if the dividend yield
is high and the restriction is severe, then it might pay to exercise the option in the usual
fashion without a reload just to get the dividends. Second, near the end of the option’s
life when it is unlikely the stock price can rise far enough to allow two more reloads,
it might be optimal to postpone the presumed final reload just as if only one reload
were permitted. The second issue is discussed in Section 4.5 on limited reloads. The
first issue will almost never be a concern.
An option should be exercised to receive dividends only if their value exceeds
the cost of early exercise. With continuous payment, the dividends received per unit
time are qS. The interest cost per unit time of exercising immediately rather than
waiting at least one more instant is rX. Therefore, a necessary condition for dividend-
induced early exercise is S > (r/q)X . If the reload restriction percentage is κ , then the
option can be reloaded when S = (1 + κ)X, and the reload restriction can therefore
be binding only if q(1 + κ) > r . The most common restriction, and the largest one
used, is κ = 25% so the dividend yield would have to exceed 80% of the interest
rate to induce a non-reloading exercise. Dividend yields are rarely this high, and this
restriction provides only a very weak lower bound since it ignores the value of the
option alive and all potential future reloads. Therefore dividend-induced early exercise
will almost never occur in practice for a level-restricted reload option.
Furthermore, even if not optimal, this policy of exercising as soon as permitted
is feasible so the value determined will be a lower bound to the actual value. The
previously determined unrestricted reload value will provide an upper bound.
Under this exercise policy, the successive reload points (and restriction levels)
can all be determined ex ante. They will be the minimum possible stock prices. If the
restriction is a constant percentage or constant dollar amount, then Km = Km−1(1 + κ)
or Km = Km−1 + κ for some fixed value of κ .
The general formula given in (6) can now be applied directly. As the exercise points,
Km , are known, we can determine the number of options exercised at each successive
stock price
RLev - Rst(S, t ; T, X ) =
∑
m=1




nm[S(S, t ; T ; Em) − KmD(S, t ; T ; Em)]
where Em ≡ {ST > Km} &
{
Smax(0,T ) < Km+1
}
(10)
19 It is the actual reloaded stock price that matters. For example, if the first reload doesn’t occur until the
stock price reaches $52, then the second reload must wait for a stock price of $65—25% above the reload
price of $52 not 25% above the original restriction. A dollar restriction works in a similar fashion. Of course,
under the optimal policy, this restriction will be binding and the options will be exercised and reloaded just





(1 + κ)−m regular reload options with a restriction
Km = (1 + κ)Km−1
X/(X + mκ) regular reload options with a restriction
Km = Km−1 + κ
[τ + (1 − τ )/(1 + κ)]m tax reload options with a restriction
Km = (1 + κ)Km−1
m∏
i=1
[1 − (1 − τ )κ/(X + iκ)] tax reload options with a restriction
Km = Km−1 + κ.
1 one-for-one reload options
Note that in valuing the level-restricted reload option we must include the second sum
that values the payoff upon possible exercise at maturity. A level-restricted option can
expire in-the-money if the stock price has not yet reached the next permitted reload
level.
Values of level-restricted reloads for representative cases are given in Table 3.
Restricting reloads of course reduces the option’s value, and the higher the restriction,
the lower is the resulting value. In terms of the percentage premium, increasing the
restriction has its greatest effect when the dividend yield and the volatility are low. In
particular, at σ = 25% and q = 0, a reload option with a 25% in-the-money restriction
has a premium only 19% above a regular American option. The unrestricted reload
option has a 27% premium so the restriction eliminates approximately one-third of
the extra value of the reload. With a dividend yield of 2%, the restricted reload option
captures three-quarters of the full unrestricted premium. Similarly at a volatility of
40%, 82% of the full reload premium is secured. How far out-of-the-money the option
is has little effect on the percentage premium.
Table 3 also illustrate that unrestricted reload options are worth substantially more
than regular options even if the option holder does not use the optimal reload policy.
For example, waiting until the option is 10% in-the-money each time before reloading
(that is exercising about twice a year if the average rate of return is 20% or once a year
if the average rate of return is 10%) reduces its value by 2 to 4% depending on the
parameters. Even waiting until the option is in-the-money by 25% before exercising
only reduces the value by 4 to 9%.
4.3 The indivisibility restriction
The explicit in-the-money restriction just described is implicit on all reload options
due to the indivisibility of the shares. Fractional shares cannot be tendered in a reload
so some portion of the exercise payment must be made in cash foregoing a reload on
that portion unless the stock price is at just the right level.
When exercising N reload options, a whole number of shares with price S can be
delivered only if NX/S is an integer. Therefore, the first time that N options can be
exercised and completely reloaded is when N − 1 shares exactly pay the aggregate
strike price; i.e., at the price K1 = NX/(N −1). The N−1 new options received in the
reload can next be exercised and reloaded when N− 2 shares can be used. This is at
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Table 3 Values of level-restricted reload options
Value of level-restricted Percentage premium above
reload option: regular american option:
RLevR (RLevR − XAm)/XAm
σ = 25% σ = 40% σ = 25% σ = 40%
q = q = q = q =
κ 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2%
American option (no reload)
48.78 34.58 60.16 46.92 0 0 0 0
Regular reload options
0% 61.79 53.48 75.26 68.63 26.7% 54.7% 25.1% 46.3%
5% 60.88 52.90 74.66 67.87 24.8% 53.0% 24.1% 44.7%
10% 60.05 51.32 74.09 67.14 23.1% 48.4% 23.2% 43.1%
15% 59.29 50.36 73.56 66.46 21.5% 45.6% 22.3% 41.7%
20% 58.60 49.47 73.06 65.80 20.1% 43.0% 21.4% 40.3%
25% 57.97 48.64 72.58 65.18 18.8% 40.6% 20.7% 38.9%
One-for-one reload options
0% 114.26 92.32 182.82 155.33 134.2% 167.0% 203.9% 231.1%
5% 109.25 87.80 175.99 149.21 123.9% 153.9% 192.6% 218.0%
10% 104.84 83.81 170.09 143.82 114.9% 142.4% 182.8% 206.5%
15% 100.95 80.26 164.64 138.87 106.9% 132.1% 173.7% 196.0%
20% 97.49 77.09 159.68 134.36 99.8% 122.9% 165.4% 186.4%
25% 94.39 74.24 155.16 130.24 93.5% 114.7% 157.9% 177.6%
Tax reload options
0% 71.50 60.94 91.41 82.21 46.6% 76.2% 52.0% 75.2%
5% 70.07 59.35 90.32 80.96 43.6% 71.6% 50.1% 72.6%
10% 68.77 57.88 89.30 79.78 41.0% 67.4% 48.4% 70.1%
15% 67.59 56.52 88.33 78.67 38.5% 63.5% 46.8% 67.7%
20% 66.50 55.27 87.42 77.61 36.3% 59.8% 45.3% 65.4%
25% 65.51 54.11 86.56 76.62 34.3% 56.5% 43.9% 63.3%
Table gives the values of regular, one-for-one, and tax reload options with a level-restricted exercise. The
percentage by which the values exceed those of regular American options are also given. The parameters
used are stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100; time to maturity: T − t = 10; logarithmic volatility:
σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free interest rate: r = 5%; withholding tax rate: τ =
27.5%. Option can be exercised and reloaded an unlimited number of times, but only when it is in-the-money
by at least κ percent. For κ = 0, the values are those of unrestricted reload options.
the price K2 = (N − 1)K1/(N − 2) = NX/(N − 2). In general, the mth reload can
occur at a stock price of Km = NX/(N − m).
For one-for-one reloads, each option is replaced by a new option so there are always
N options, and the mth reload occurs at a stock price of Km = [N/(N − 1)]m X.
For a tax reload option, the aggregate strike price and withholding tax for the first
reload, NX + N (K1 − X )τ is paid with N− 1 shares (with value K1). This same
relation holds for each subsequent reload. Noting that the number of options decreases
by one at each reload, we see that the m + 1st reload occurs at a stock price of
Km+1 = Km(1 − τ )(N − m)/[(N − m)(1 − τ ) − 1].
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The formula in (10) can now be applied using these relations for the successive
exercise points, Km . The value per option of N original reload options subject to an
integer restriction is











[S(S, t ; T ; Em) − KmD(S, t ; T ; Em)]
where Em ≡ {ST > Km} &
{




⎧⎨⎩N − mN − mN and Km+1 ≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
NX/(N − m) regular reload options
(N − m)(1 − τ )
(N − m)(1 − τ ) − 1 Km tax reload options
X [N/(N − 1)]m one-for-one reload options
Even with a small original grant size, the integer exercise constraint has a miniscule
effect on the value of the reload. For example, with a grant of 100 options, the integer-
restricted value is about one-half percent less than the unrestricted value. The reason
for this small effect on value is clear from the level-restricted options. With an original
grant of 100 options, the first reload occurs when the option is about 1% in-the-money,
and the 50th reload occurs when the latest generation option is 2% in-the-money (after
the stock has doubled from its original price). Restrictions of this magnitude have
almost no effect, and most reload grants are larger than 100, so the effects of the
integer constraint can safely be ignored in most circumstances.20
4.4 Reload options with vesting
Reload options, like other compensation options must vest before they can be exer-
cised, and any restriction, like vesting, that limits the owner’s rights will decrease the
option value. With a regular option, vesting only reduces the value to the extent the
employee might want to exercise before the option vested. For example, often rights to
the option are lost if employment is terminated before vesting. With a reload option,
vesting could have a substantial impact on the value since the optimal policy is to
exercise as soon as they are in the money and to continue to reload as the price rises.
There are a number of different rules used to vest options. The most common are
cliff vesting, straight vesting, stepped vesting, and performance vesting. With cliff
vesting, all options granted on a given date vest after a set period of time, usually two
to four years. With straight vesting the same proportion vests each year during the
option’s life—for example 10% each year over a ten-year maturity. Stepped-vesting
options also vest over the option’s life, but a different proportion can vest each year;
20 Similarly it is safe to ignore the discrete price changes. For example, if due to delays or sudden stock
price increases, the option is not reloaded until it is a few percent in-the-money there will be minimal effect
on the value.
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for example, 10, 20, 30 and 40% in the first through fourth years. Performance vesting
links the vesting of the options to meeting certain targets in sales, earnings, etc. In this
paper we examine only cliff vesting; however, straight and stepped-vesting options
are easily valued as portfolios of cliff-vesting options with different vesting periods.
Usually only the first generation reload options have a long vesting time. The later
generation options can often be exercised immediately after they are granted or within
a very short vesting period like 6 months. In this paper we analyze only reloads whose
later generations vest immediately.
Let To denote the vesting date. Before vesting, the option cannot be exercised or
reloaded. If the option is in-the-money on the vesting date, then it will be immediately
exercised for ST o − X and reloaded. If the option is out-of-the-money on the vesting
date (regardless if it was ever in-the-money prior to that date), it will be exercised as
soon as it is in-the-money. In either case, the option will be exercised and reloaded
thereafter each time the stock price hits a new high. Apart from missing exercises prior
to the vesting date, this is the same as a regular reload option.
Once the option is vested, the value is given by the formula already presented in (9);
therefore, the simplest way to value the option is to discount its value as of the vesting
date, To. If the option is out-of-the-money on the vesting date, it becomes a vested
reload option worth Rθ (ST o , To; T , X ) as given in (9). If the option is in-the-money, it
is exercised for ST o − X and new options are granted. A regular reload option receives
X/ST o at-the-money options. A tax reload option receives an additional τ (ST o − X )/ST o
options, and a one-for-one option is granted one new option. The general rule is that
θ + (1 − θ )X/ST o new options are granted. So the value of the reload option before it
has vested is
Rθ (S, t ; T, X ; T
o) = e−r (T o−t)
[∫ X
0
Rθ (ST o , T
o; T, X ) f̂ (ST o , T




(ST o − X ) f̂ (ST o , T o; S, t) d ST o +
∫ ∞
X
[θ + (1 − θ )X ST o ]
× Rθ (ST o , T o; T, ST o ) f̂ (ST o , T o; S, t) d ST o
]
. (12)
where f̂ (·) is the risk-neutral probability density of the stock price on the vesting time
To, and θ = 0, 1, or τ for regular, one-for-one, and tax reload options respectively.
The formula is derived in the Appendix.




β − b − θ 2
(
d+X , −do+X , −ρ
) − Xb+β+1S−β−b
b + β + θ 2
(
d−X , −do−X , −ρ
)
+ Se−q(T o−t)(ho+S/X) [1 + θ Rθ (1, T o; T, 1)] − Xe−r (T o−t)(ho−S/X)
× [1 − (1 − θ )Rθ (1, T o; T, 1)] − X1−θ Sθe−ζ (T −t)









T − t,−ho−S/X − θ
√
T o − t, −ρ) (13)
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where ζ ≡ r − θ [r − q − 1
2
(1 − θ )σ 2] and do±x and ho±x are the same as d±x and h±x
defined in (4) and (5) with a maturity of To instead of T .
The formula reduces to (9) as the length of the vesting period goes to zero, To
→ t . At the other extreme as To → T , the unvested option can never be exercised
and reloaded so the value of each type of reload option approaches that of a standard
European option maturing at time T . Other values are given in Table 4 and Fig. 4.
Vesting, of course, reduces the option’s value, and the longer the vesting period,
the lower is the resulting value. A vesting requirement reduces the value of a reload
Table 4 Values of reload options subject to vesting
Value of vesting-restricted Percentage premium above
reload option: regular American option:
RVest (RVest − XAm)/XAm
σ = 25% σ = 40% σ = 25% σ = 40%
q = q = q = q =
T o − t 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2%
American option (no reload)
48.78 34.58 60.16 46.92 0 0 0 0
Regular reload options
0 61.79 53.48 75.26 68.63 26.7% 54.7% 25.1% 46.3%
1 61.45 52.56 74.75 67.37 26.0% 52.0% 24.3% 43.6%
2 61.05 51.49 74.21 65.95 25.2% 48.9% 23.4% 40.6%
3 60.60 50.31 73.61 64.43 24.2% 45.5% 22.4% 37.3%
4 60.08 49.03 72.94 62.79 23.2% 41.8% 21.3% 33.8%
5 59.46 47.63 72.17 61.05 21.9% 37.7% 20.0% 30.1%
One-for-one reload options
0 114.26 92.32 182.82 155.33 134.2% 167.0% 203.9% 231.1%
1 111.64 89.31 176.91 148.94 128.9% 158.3% 194.1% 217.5%
2 108.30 85.72 169.39 141.51 122.0% 147.9% 181.6% 201.6%
3 104.41 81.73 161.65 133.41 114.0% 136.3% 168.7% 184.4%
4 100.01 77.39 152.74 124.74 105.0% 123.8% 153.9% 165.9%
5 95.09 72.71 143.01 115.55 94.9% 110.3% 137.7% 146.3%
Tax reload options
0 71.50 60.94 91.41 82.21 46.6% 76.2% 52.0% 75.2%
1 70.86 59.71 90.43 80.39 45.3% 72.7% 50.3% 71.4%
2 70.08 58.25 89.28 78.32 43.7% 68.5% 48.4% 66.9%
3 69.16 56.64 87.96 76.05 41.8% 63.8% 46.2% 62.1%
4 68.07 54.86 86.44 73.58 39.5% 58.6% 43.7% 56.8%
5 66.80 52.91 84.68 70.90 36.9% 53.0% 40.8% 51.1%
Table gives the values of regular, one-for-one, and tax reload options with a vesting restriction on exercise.
The percentage by which the values exceed those of regular American options are also given. The parameters
used are stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100; time to maturity: T − t = 10; logarithmic volatility:
σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free interest rate: r = 5%; withholding tax rate:
τ = 27.5%. The time until vesting and first permitted exercising reload is: To − t = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. For
To − t = 0, the values are those of unrestricted reload options.
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Fig. 4 Values of reload options against time until vesting. (This graph plots the values of regular, tax
and one-for-one reload options against the time until vesting of the option. The parameters used are stock
price and strike price: $100, time to maturity: 10 years, logarithmic volatility: 25%, dividend yield: 2%,
default-free interest rate: 5%, and withholding tax rate: 27.5%)
option more than it does the value a regular option. Tax reloads and one-for one reloads
are even more affected. There are three value-reducing effects of vesting on reload
options, lost dividends, missed opportunities, and share lag.
The loss of dividends is the most obvious effect. When the stock price rises suffi-
ciently relative to the strike price, it becomes optimal to exercise any call option to get
the dividends that will be paid during the remainder of its life. If the stock price rises
quickly, it could be optimal to exercise an option before the vesting period lapses.
This is true for both ordinary options and reloads, but the effect on value is larger
for reloads because, in the absence of a vesting requirement, they would be exercised
sooner and repeatedly during the vesting period so more dividends would be missed.
The lost dividend effect is higher, the longer the vesting period and the higher the
dividend yield.
Since no cash is used to exercise a reload option, the value of a reload written
on a stock not paying dividends depends only on the net number of shares of stock
that are eventually acquired.21 For an ordinary reload option, the net number of shares
accumulated is 1 − X/Slast where Slast is the stock price at the time of the last reload. If
the optimal exercise policy is followed, the option will be exercised each time the stock
price reaches a new high so the stock price at the last reload is the maximum price after
the vesting period ends, and the net number of shares accumulated is 1 − X/Smax(T o,T ).
For tax and one-for-one reloads, the net number of shares acquired depends on more
21 The net number of shares of stock acquired cannot be used to compare the value of tax reload options to
regular or one-for-one options because some of the change in the number of shares has been used to pay
the taxes. It is a valid comparison within a given type.
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than just the price at the last reload. If the option is in-the-money when it vests, prior
“missed” reload opportunities will permanently depress the accumulation of shares
even if the stock reaches its maximum price at a later time. When in-the-money at the
end of the vesting period, the net number of shares accumulated on a regular, a tax,
and a one-for-one reload subject to vesting are22
1 − (X/Smax(T o,T )) ≤ 1 − (X/Smax(t,T ))
1 − X + τ (ST o − X )ST o
(
ST o/Smax(T o,T )
)1 − τ
< 1 − (X/Smax(t,T ))1−τ
ST o −X
ST o
+ ln (Smax(T o,T )/ST o) < ln (Smax(t,T )/X). (14)
In each case the difference between the maximum stock price and the post-vesting
maximum stock price is the missed opportunities. The remainder of the difference
between the left-hand and right-hand sides is the share lag. For example, if the stock
price rises 10% per year, then at the end of a four-year vesting period a tax reload
option will have accumulated 5% fewer shares while a one-for-one reload will have
accumulated 20% fewer shares.
4.5 Options with a limited number of reloads
Another common restriction on reload options is a limit on the number of times they
can be reloaded. For example, Norwest’s original plan permitted only one reload; the
second-generation option was ordinary. First Bank System permits up to three reloads.
When the number of reloads is limited, the value is reduced and the optimal exercise
policy is more difficult to determine. Clearly, exercising as soon as the option is a tiny
bit in-the-money can no longer always be optimal. Doing so would throw away one
reload opportunity for virtually no gain. What then is the optimal reload policy?
This problem is very much like that of determining the optimal exercise policy for
an American put, and it can be solved in a similar fashion. Let K (t) denote the policy
used to exercise the option. That is, the option is exercised and reloaded when the stock
price reaches the “barrier” K (t) for the first time. Let t K denote the (random) first time
the stock price reaches the barrier. When the option is exercised, X/S = X/K (t K )
shares are tendered and are replaced by the same number of options. If only a single
reload is permitted, the value at this point is
K (t K ) − X + X
K (t K )
CAm(K (t
K ), t K ; T, K (t K )) (15)
22 As shown in and just after Eq. (8), if the optimal exercise policy is followed, the number of options held per
original tax reload is (X/Smax)1−τ . If the option has a vesting period and is in-the-money at its end, the tax
reload option will be exercised then using [X + τ (ST o − X )]/ST o shares and receiving the same number of
new at-the-money options. At any later date, each of these options will have become (ST o /Smax(T o,T ))1−τ new
options. So the total net accumulation of shares is 1 − [X + τ (ST o − X )]/ST o (ST o /Smax(T o,T ))1−τ . With a
one-for-one reload, at each reload one option is used to acquire one share giving up Km−1/Km shares where
Km are the successive stock prices at exercise. The net increase in shares is 1 − Km−1/Km = K/K . If
the option is in-the-money on the vesting date, then (ST o − X )/ST o are acquired. After the vesting date,
the total net increase in shares, under the optimal policy, is
∫ Smax(T o ,T )
ST o
d K/K = ln (Smax(T o,T )/ST o ).
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where CAm(S, t ; T, X ) is the value of an ordinary American option maturing at time T
with a strike price of Xwritten at time t on a share of stock with price S.23 For a given
reload policy the only source of uncertainty is the time that the reloading exercise
occurs since the policy, K (t), is known. Under Black-Scholes conditions (or any other
conditions when the option price is homogeneous of degree one in the stock and strike
prices), this expression simplifies to
K (t K ) − X + CAm(X, t K ; T, X ). (16)
The current (pre-reloaded) value of an option with one permitted reload is the
present value of this barrier payment plus the present value of Max[ST − X , 0] if
reload does not occur.24 The value is
R̂L−1 (S, t ; T, X ; K (t))
= S(S, t ; T ; {ST > X} & {t K > T }) − XD(S, t ; T ; {ST > X} & {t K > T })
+ Ê[e−r (t K −t)[K (t K ) − X + CAm(X, t K ; T, X )]]. (17)
The first line is the present value of exercising the original option at maturity if it has
not been reloaded. The second line is the present value of the exercise and reload at
t K . The expectation in this term is over the random (stopping) time of the stochastic
process since the payoff is a known function of t K . The implicit expectations in the
first line are over both time t K being after the maturity date and the final stock price
ST .
Equation (17) gives the value for an arbitrary reload policy K (t). The optimal reload
policy maximizes this expression, and the value of the reload option is this maximized
value, RL−1 = MaxK (t){R̂L−1}. As with an American option, the complete solution
to the valuation problem is a simultaneous determination of the value, RL−1, and the
optimal policy, K ∗(t).
The optimal exercise decision is, in essence, an attempt to pick the maximum
price that the stock will reach during the option’s life. If the maximum price could
be pinpointed exactly, then (ignoring dividends) more than one exercising reload
would be irrelevant for a regular reload—exercising once at the maximum stock price
would achieve the highest possible payoff, one that matched that on the unrestricted
reload option. Of course, the maximum price cannot be picked except with hindsight.
Choosing a policy with a high K (t) will increase the in-the-money amount at exercise,
K (t) − X , but it will also increase the time required before this level is reached. That
reduces the time to maturity and therefore the value of the ordinary option received
in the reload. The discount factor applied will also reduce the present value of both
terms in (17). The optimal exercise policy correctly trades off these features. With
23 While the option cannot be reloaded a second time, it can be exercised in the usual fashion so we need to
use an American option in (15). Under Black-Scholes conditions, the value of an American option will be
homogeneous of degree one in the stock and strike prices as required in (16) provided the dividend yield is
constant.
24 We need not consider the payoff on exercising without reloading as this can never be optimal. Exercising
the option is worth S − X. Exercising with a reload is worth this plus the value of the option received.
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dividends, the optimal policy is shaded earlier because the reloaded option is less
valuable.
For a one-for-one or tax-reload option the same basic methodology applies.25 The
only difference is a different number of options are received in the reload. With a
tax reload option τ + (1 − τ )X/K ∗(t) are received when the option is reloaded as
the stock price hits the “barrier”, K ∗(t). With a one-for-one option, one new option is
received. The reload payoffs for a tax-reload option and a one-for-one reload that can be
exercised only once are given by (15) with τ + (1 − τ )X/K ∗(t K ) and one American
option received instead of X/K ∗(t K ), respectively. Equation (17) is similarly adjusted.
Unfortunately, all of these valuations are free-boundary problems like the Amer-
ican put and have no known analytical solutions. Various different numerical pro-
cedures have been developed to price free-boundary options. Here we can apply
the barrier approximation in Ingersoll (1998). This method solves (17) analyti-
cally using a parameterized barrier. Then it maximizes over the parameters numer-
ically. For simplicity, we illustrate with a constant barrier reload policy, K (t) = K1
and a constant barrier exercise, K2, of the standard American options received in
the reload.26
If the option is exercised and reloaded when the stock price reaches K1, and the
second-generation (American) options are exercised without a reload at a stock price
of K2, then the value of the original reload option is approximately
RL−1(S, t ; T, X )
>≈ Max
K1,K2
{S(S, t ; T ; {ST > X} & {Smax < K1})
− XD(S, t ; T ;{ST > X} & {Smax < K1}) + (K1 − X )T (S, t ; T, K1)
+ (X/K1)(K2 − K1)T (S, t ; T, K2)
+ (X/K1) × [S(S, t ; T ; {ST > K1} & {Smax < K2})
− K1D(S, t ; T ; {ST > K1} & {Smax < K2})]}. (18)
The first two terms give the present value of the exercising the option at maturity if
it was not reloaded. The second line gives the present value of the exercises; K1 − X
is realized at the first exercise, and K2 − K1 is realized per option at the exercise
of the second-generation options. The third line gives the value of exercising the
second-generation options at maturity if they were not exercised previously.27 One-for-
one and tax reloads are similarly valued by changing the number of second-generation
options received from X/K1 to one or τ + (1 − τ )X/K1, respectively. The symbol >≈
25 For tax and one-for-one reloads it is not true, even in the absence of dividends, that simply guessing the
maximum stock price achieved during the life of the option would provide the maximum payoff; however,
the intuition is still basically valid.
26 This method is extremely accurate for long-lived options. The values reported in Table 5 were compared
to the exact price computed with a binomial model of 1000 steps employing a control variate correction
using a European call option. All errors were substantially less than 1%, and they averaged about one quarter
of a percent. See Ingersoll (1998) for more details.
27 If the dividend yield is zero, then the ordinary American option received in the reload will never be
exercised. In this case we need not search for the maximizing value of K2 which will be infinite.
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Table 5 Values of reload options with a limited number of reloads
Value of limited Percentage premium above
reload option: regular American option:
RL−M (RL−M − XAm)/XAm
σ = 25% σ = 40% σ = 25% σ = 40%
q = q = q = q =
M 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2%
American option (no reload)
48.78 34.58 60.16 46.92 0 0 0 0
Regular reload options
1 52.32 41.19 65.03 55.19 7.2% 19.1% 8.1% 17.6%
2 54.26 44.20 67.42 58.75 11.2% 27.8% 12.1% 25.2%
3 55.51 45.96 68.87 60.76 13.8% 32.9% 14.5% 29.5%
∞ 61.79 53.48 75.26 68.63 26.7% 54.7% 25.1% 46.3%
One-for-one reload options
1 64.53 48.94 86.64 70.72 32.3% 41.5% 44.0% 50.7%
2 73.53 57.12 102.84 85.32 50.7% 65.2% 71.0% 81.9%
3 79.53 62.48 114.00 95.16 63.0% 80.7% 89.5% 102.8%
∞ 114.26 92.32 182.82 155.33 134.2% 167.0% 203.9% 231.1%
Tax reload options
1 55.64 43.31 70.89 59.41 14.1% 25.2% 17.9% 26.6%
2 59.06 47.46 75.87 65.17 21.1% 37.2% 26.1% 38.9%
3 61.19 49.92 78.82 68.44 25.4% 44.4% 31.0% 45.9%
∞ 71.50 60.94 91.41 82.21 46.6% 76.2% 52.0% 75.2%
Table gives the approximate values (and lower bound to value) of regular, one-for-one, and tax reload
options with a limited number of reloads. The percentage by which the values exceed those of regular
American options are also given. The parameters used are stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100; time
to maturity: T − t = 10; logarithmic volatility: σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free
interest rate: r = 5%; withholding tax rate: τ = 27.5%. The maximum number of reloads permitted is M
= 1, 2, 3. For M = ∞, the values are those of unrestricted reload options.
indicates that this approximation is a lower bound to the true value. Since a constant
exercise policy is feasible, the optimal policy must give at least as large a value.
If M reloads are allowed, more terms are simply added. There is a barrier for each
reload plus a final barrier for the exercise of the last generation American option. The
values of the various limited reloads options are




nm {S (S, t ; T ; {ST > Km} & {Smax < Km+1})
− KmD (S, t ; T ; {ST > Km} & {Smax < Km+1})
+ (Km+1 − Km)T (S, t ; T, Km+1)} (19)
where nm =
⎧⎨⎩ X/Km regular reload optionsnm−1[τ + (1 − τ )Km−1/Km] tax reload options
1 one-for-one reload options
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Fig. 5 Optimal exercise and reload policies for reload option with a limited number of reloads. (This graph
plots the optimal policies for exercise and reload of the last three reloads on a regular reload option as a per-
cent of the existing strike price (Note the strike price increases with each reload to the prevailing stock price).
The parameters used are logarithmic volatility: 25%, dividend yield: 2%, and default-free interest rate: 5%)
and K0 ≡ X , n0 ≡ 1. KM+1 is the exercise point for the final generation of ordinary
American options. These cannot be reloaded but only exercised in the usually fashion
to receive KM+1 − KM without new options.
Representative values of limited reload options are given in Table 5. As seen there,
an option with a single reload has about 25 to 35% of the premium that an unrestricted
reload option commands. Options with two or three permitted reloads command a
premium 40 to 55% and 50 to 65% as large as those on unrestricted options. The
higher percentages occur when the dividend yield and/or variance are larger. The
percentage of the premium captured by limited tax-reload options is about the same
as for regular limited reloads; however the percentage premium captured by limited
one-for-one reloads is quite a bit smaller.
The optimal exercise policies for multiple-reload options are shown in Fig. 5.28 As
illustrated, the optimal policy is to make each succeeding reload at a higher in-the-
money percentage. This statement is true of the policy rather than the result. Since all
the optimal exercise policies decrease as maturity nears, succeeding reloads may, of
course, be made when the option is in-the-money by a lesser percentage. When there
are many reloads left, using one does not give up too many future rights. However,
when only a few reloads are left, each one must be husbanded against possible need
in the future if the stock price rises more. Therefore, a higher immediate benefit in
terms of the in-the-money amount must be realized with each reload.
As time passes and the maturity shortens, the optimal exercise policies drop towards
the strike price so that an option with a very short term to maturity is reloaded even if
28 The approximate optimal exercise policies are determined by the fixed-point method described in Ingersoll
(1998). Unlike the true optimal policy which depends only on time, the best constant policy depend on the
current stock price as well; i.e., K ∗1 = K (S, t). The optimal policy is approximated as the minimum stock
price at which S = K (S, t).
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it is in-the-money only by a very small amount. On the other hand, a regular American
option with a very short term to maturity is not exercised unless the stock price is
greater than rX/q. This is $250 for the parameters used in construction Fig. 5. The
cost per unit time of accelerating the exercise of an option is rX, but the benefit is
only the dividends realized, qS. Therefore, exercise should occur only if qS > rX.
With a reload option, there is no out-of pocket cost to exercise for reload, and, as
previously discussed, the payoff to a reloaded option dominates that on an option never
reloaded.
5 Subjective and objective valuation of reload options
Thus far only the market prices of the reload options have been discussed. But what
is of true interest are the cost of the option to the company and the value of the option
to the recipient. As is well-known, the market price of a compensation option exceeds
its value to the recipient. This subjective value of the option reflects the disutility
of holding it in an under-diversified portfolio. The difference between the subjective
value and market price depends on a number of factors—the most important of which
are the agent’s risk-aversion, the degree under-diversification, and the residual risk of
the underlying asset.29
The objective cost of the option lies somewhere between the subjective and market
values. Options are exercised when their value is equal to the amount by which they
are in-the-money. Since compensation options cannot be sold, it is the subjective value
rather than the market value that needs to be compared to the when-exercised value.
And because the subjective value is below the market value, it is optimal to exercise a
compensation option at a lower stock price than the corresponding marketable option.
For example, as shown in Ingersoll (2006), an ordinary incentive option is optimally
exercised before maturity even if the stock is not paying dividends. The objective cost
of an option is its value to a fully diversified holder but under the optimal subjective
exercise policy. Because incentive options may be exercised when objectively subop-
timal (but subjectively optimal), the objective value can be lower than the value of the
corresponding marketable option. The objective value is the proper cost measure to the
issuing corporation because the recipients do not follow the market-value maximizing
exercise policy.
In Ingersoll (2006) it is shown how the Black-Scholes model can be used with an
adjustment in the parameters to compute an option’s subjective and objective values.
In this section, those methods are applied to reload options. The subjective value of
a derivative contract to an under-diversified agent can be computed by replacing the
interest rate and dividend yield by
r ′ ≡ r − ξα2v2 q ′ ≡ q + ξα(1 − α)v2 (20)
29 See, for example, Carpenter (1998), Huddart and Lang (1996), Ingersoll (2006) and Lambert et al. (1991)




where ξ is the agent’s relative risk aversion, α is the excess fraction of wealth held in
the common stock (or equivalents),30 and v is the residual (and unhedgeable) standard
deviation of the common stock. Note that the modified interest rate and dividend yield
are smaller and larger, respectively, than the actual values. Both of these changes
reduce the value of a call option and therefore make early exercise more likely. The
objective value of an option is computed with the market parameters, r and q, but with
the exercise policy that maximizes the subjective value.
For unrestricted reloads, level-restricted reloads, and reloads subject to vesting, ex-
ercise and reload occur as soon as possible under the optimal objective exercise policy
so there can be no acceleration of exercise for the best subjective policy. Therefore,
the objective values of these reload option types are equal to the previously computed
market values. Options with a limited number of reloads typically do have optimal
subjective policies that accelerate their exercises relative to the objective policy.
Table 6 gives the subjective values of various reload options for an agent with a
relative risk aversion of 4 who holds 50% of his wealth in the company’s stock or
equivalents. The discounts are larger for all options for the higher variance since the
lack of diversification hurts more in this case. The relative discounts are always largest
on one-for-one reloads and smallest on regular reloads for each type of option. The
intuition for this result is that the one-for-one reload option has the most implicit future
options and the regular reloads have the fewest.
By this reasoning, the discount on the regular American option should be smaller
than on all of the unrestricted reloads, but we see this is not necessarily the case.
The American option is subjected to two discounts. Along with the discount due
to under-diversification, the American option is objectively reduced in value by the
sub-optimal (from a market perspective) exercise policy. For example, with q = 0
and σ = 25%, the unrestricted regular reload option has a subjective discount of
$14.54 (= 61.79 − 47.25) or 23.5%. The American option is reduced in value by
$6.11 (= 48.78 − 42.67) due to its sub-optimal exercise policy and further reduced
in subjective value by $15.19 (= 42.67 − 27.48) due to under-diversification. The
total discount is 43.7%. Note that the under-diversification discount is about the same
magnitude for both. It is a bit larger for the American option due to differences in
timing of when the returns are realized.31 The limited reload also has two discounts.
Its value is reduced by $2.50 due to the suboptimal exercise policy and further reduced
by $15.53 to the subjective value for a total discount of 34.5%.
The objective value of an option represents its cost to the issuing corporation. For
example, this is the value that should be reported when expensing an option. The
subjective value is a measure of the option’s worth to the recipient so it should be used
when comparing different forms of compensation or determining the incentive effects.
For example, from the first line in Table 6, one thousand reload options would cost
the issuing corporation $61,790 but be worth only $47,250 dollars to the recipient.
30 The variable α measures the excess of the common stock held above that in the manager’s optimal
portfolio. For example, if the conditions of the CAPM hold, and the optimal holding is the market portfolio,
then α is amount of stock held in excess of its presence in the market portfolio.
31 The change in parameters in (20) acts as a change in the discount rate. The reload options are exercised
repeatedly, and on average sooner than the American options, so the change in rate has a larger effect on
the longer-lived American option.
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Table 7 Subjective deltas and cost per unit delta of reload options
σ = 25% (v = 15%) σ = 40% (v = 36.4%)
q = 0 q = 2% q = 0 q = 2%
Objective deltas
European 0.846 0.638 0.847 0.660
American (market) 0.846 0.658 0.847 0.701
American (objective) 0.706 0.576 0.369 0.361
Regular reload 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999
One-for-one reload 2.137 1.916 2.823 2.547
Tax reload 1.195 1.164 1.250 1.224
Subjective deltas
European 0.539 0.378 0.058 0.037
American 0.588 0.516 0.438 0.430
Regular reload 0.996 0.994 0.989 0.988
One-for-one reload 1.759 1.611 1.445 1.397
Tax reload 1.142 1.117 1.084 1.075
Cost per unit delta
European 89.80 1037.38 88.93 1202.22
American 71.97 67.89 59.38 61.08
Regular reload 61.52 75.55 53.29 68.95
One-for-one reload 64.34 125.56 56.73 110.29
Tax reload 62.11 83.75 54.04 75.91
Table gives the options’ subjective deltas. This is the change in the subjective value per dollar change
in the stock price. The values are computed using stock price: S = 100, strike price: X = 100; time to
maturity: T − t = 10; logarithmic volatility: σ = 25%, 40%; dividend yield: q = 0%, 2%; default-free
interest rate: r = 5%; withholding tax rate: τ = 27.5%. The vesting-restricted options vest after 4 years.
The level-restricted options must be 25% in-the-money to be exercised and reloaded. They can be reloaded
multiple times. The limited options can only be reloaded a single time. The subjective values are determined
for an agent with a relative risk aversion of ξ = 4 holding α = 50% of his wealth in the common stock or
equivalents. The residual standard deviation is v = 15% and 34.6% for σ = 25%, 40%, respectively. This
corresponds to a beta of one and a market standard deviation of 20%.
Therefore, unless the incentive, retention, tax, and other benefits were worth at least
$14,540, these reloads would not be an economically cost-effective form of compen-
sation.
The incentive effects of compensation options are often calculated using the option’s
delta.32 The delta is the ratio of the change in the option’s value to the change in the
price of a share of stock so it is a measure of the compensation relative to shareholder
gain. To properly measure incentive effects, it is the delta of the subjective value that
should be used since that is the relevant increase to the option holder. Table 7 shows the
subjective and objective deltas and the cost per unit of subjective delta of the various
reload and ordinary options.
32 Delta is less than an ideal incentive measure. It is a “local” number which changes over time and as the
stock price rises or falls. Typically it is larger on average over the life of an option than it is at issuance. Nor
can it be used in comparisons across companies since it does consider the number of shares outstanding.
Nevertheless, it is an often cited number in the compensation literature, and it will likely be more so in the
future as the Black-Scholes and binomial models are being used to determine option expenses.
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Subjective deltas are uniformly lower than objective (and market) deltas for unre-
stricted reload options. This should come as no surprise since the primary determinant
of an option’s delta is its degree of moneyness, and subjectively any option is fur-
ther out of the money than it is objectively; that is, Se(r
′−q ′)(T −t)/X < Se(r−q)(T −t)/X.
Of course, regular reloads have objective and subjective deltas that are very close to
one when at-the-money because they will be exercised and reloaded almost imme-
diately. One-for-one and tax reloads have deltas that exceed one due to their extra
features.
The last portion of Table 7 gives the objective cost per unit of subjective delta.
This is a measure of the relative cost effectiveness of the various options in providing
incentives. Generally, reloads are more cost effective than ordinary options if dividend
yields are low. Regular reloads are always the most cost effective types. While divi-
dends reduce deltas, they reduce the values of ordinary options more so that the cost
per unit delta is lower at higher dividends yields. For reload options, the opposite is
true as dividends do not reduce the values as much.
6 Conclusion
Incentive options are a substantial component of compensation, and their use has
risen dramatically over the quarter century. Recently companies have been required
to estimate and report the cost of granted options. Currently, the suggested method of
expensing reload options is to value each reload as a different grant. This paper derives
a formula for valuing such options ex ante. Common features such as tax reloads, one-
for-one reloads, vesting requirements, in-the-money restrictions, and limited reloads
are all discussed and handled.
Although the formula is a bit more complex than Black-Scholes, the model itself
is actually easier to employ since no estimate or approximation of the average option
retention time is required except in the case of limited reloads. And even in this case,
the model is no more difficult to employ than is the Black-Scholes model. It is also
shown that the computed values are not sensitive to the option holders following the
optimal reload policy exactly.
Appendix: Mathematical derivations and proofs
This appendix collects the mathematical derivations of the pricing formulas. The
Black-Scholes model is based on the lognormal distribution. We first present some
preliminary results for the cumulative univariate, (·), and bivariate, 2(·), normal
distribution functions.
Lemma 1. The indefinite integral of the cumulative normal function is
η
∫
(α + ηx) dx = (α + ηx)(α + ηx) + φ(α + ηx) + C.
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Proof: Integrating by parts gives
η
∫
(α + ηx) dx = ηx(α + ηx) − η2
∫
xφ(α + ηx) dx
= ηx(α + ηx) − η
∫
(α + ηx)φ(α + ηx) dx + ηα
∫
φ(α + ηx) dx
= (α + ηx)(α + ηx) − η
∫
(α + ηx)φ(α + ηx) dx . (A1)
Now define u ≡ 1
2
(α + ηx)2, and the remaining integral is (2π )−1/2 ∫ e−u du =
−(2π )−1/2e−u . Then the result follows immediately. 
Lemma 2. The indefinite integral of the product of an exponential function and the
cumulative normal function is
δ
∫
eδx(α + ηx) dx = eδx(α + ηx) − e−αδ/η+δ2/2η2(α − δ/η + ηx) + C.
Proof: Integrating by parts gives
δ
∫
eδx(α + ηx) dx = eδx(α + ηx) − η
∫
eδxφ(α + ηx) dx . (A2)
Now use the substitution
eδxφ(α + ηx) = e−αδ/η+δ2/2η2φ(α − δ/η + ηx). (A3)
The result follows immediately by integration. 
The standard bivariate normal density and distributions functions are




exp([u2 − 2ρuv + v2]/2(1 − ρ2))












1 − ρ2) dx .(A4)
Lemma 3. The indefinite integral of the product of the cumulative normal function
and the normal density function is
η
∫





+ ηx, sgn(η)ηγ − λ(α − δ/η)√
η2 + λ2






Proof: Using (A3), the integrand is e−αδ/η+δ
2/2η2φ(α − δ/η + ηx)(γ + λx).
Now define z ≡ α − δ/η + ηx, v ≡ sgn(η)[ηγ − λ(α − δ/η]/
√
η2 + λ2, and
ρ ≡ −λ sgn(η)/
√
η2 + λ2. Then
η
∫




(v − ρz)/√1 − ρ2) dz
= e−αδ/η+δ2/2η22(z, v, ρ) (A5)
where the last equality follows from the last equality in (A4). Substituting for z, v,
and ρ gives the desired result. 
A.1 Valuing the unrestricted reload options
The values of the unrestricted reload options are given by the integral
Rθ (S, t ; T, X ) =
∫ ∞
X
(X/K )1−θT (S, t ; T, K ) d K
where T (S, t ; T ; k) ≡ (k/S)b−β · (d+k ) + (k/S)b+β · (d−k ) (A6)
with d±k ≡
ln(S/k) ± βσ 2(T − t)
σ
√







b2 + 2r/σ 2
and θ = 0, 1, and τ for the regular, one-for-one, and tax reloads, respectively. Define
x ≡ n(K ), then the integral is
















Lemma 2 can now be applied to the two integrals with








T − t . (A8)






= (b + θ ∓ β) ln S − [r (1 − θ ) − qθ − 1
2









σ 2](T − t)
σ
√














β + b + θ (d
−
X )






r − θ[r − q − 1
2
(1 − θ )σ 2] X1−θe−(r+ 12 θσ 2)(1−θ )(T −t)Sθe−θq(T −t)
× (h−S/X + θσ√T − t). (A10)
This is Eq. (9) in the text.
When q = 0, then β = b + 1. In this case, the first integral is ∫ e(θ−1)x(d+K (x)) dx ,
and we use Lemma 1 to evaluate it for the one-for-one option (θ = 1) giving the
expression in footnote 9.
A.2 Valuing the unrestricted reload option with vesting
The integral representation of the value of a reload option subject to vesting at
time To is given in (12) as the present value of the in-the-money amount and
θ + (1 − θ )X/ST o at-the-money reload options if it is in-the-money at vesting plus
the present value of the same reload option if it is out-of-the-money at vesting
time.
Rθ (S, t ; T, X ; T












[θ + (1 − θ )X/z]Rθ (z, T o; T, z) f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz
]
.
where Rθ (·) in the second and third integrals is the value of a vested reload option of
the same type as given in (A10).









Since Rθ (·) is homogeneous of degree one in the stock and strike prices, the third





[θ + (1 − θ )X/z]Rθ (z, T o; T, z) f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz





z f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz + (1 − θ )X
∫ ∞
X
f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz
]






) + (1 − θ )Xe−r (T o−t)(ho−S/X)] (A13)
from (A10). This can be verified by analogy with the Black-Scholes model. The two
integrals on the right hand side of (A13) will be recognized as the present value of
receiving θ shares of stock and X (1 − θ ) dollars, respectively, at time To if the stock
price then is greater than X. The multiplier can be determined from (A10)
Rθ (1, T







T − T o) − 1
β + b + θ










(b + θ )σ√T − T o) (A14)
where ζ ≡ r − θ[r − q − 1
2
(1 − θ )σ 2].
Note that ζ = r or q for θ = 0 or 1, respectively.
The first integral in (A11) is∫ X
0
Rθ (z, T
o; T, X ) f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz
= X
b−β+1
β − b − θ
∫ X
0
zβ−b(d ′+X ) f̂ (z, T
o; S, t) dz
− X
b+β+1
β + b + θ
∫ X
0
z−b−β(d ′−X ) f̂ (z, T
o; S, t) dz (A15)













T − T o) f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz
where d ′ and h′ are the same as d and h with a stock price of z and a time to maturity
of T − To. Now let x ≡ n(z). Then since f̂ (z) dz = z−1φ(−ho−S/z) dz = φ(−ho−S/z) dx ,
these three integrals can be evaluated using Lemma 3 for each part. For all three
integrals η = 1/σ√T o − t , α = −[ln S + (r − q − 1
2
σ 2)(T o − t)]/σ√T o − t , and
λ = 1/σ√T − T o . The other two parameters, δ and γ , are different; δ = 1 ±
β − b and δ = 1 + θ while γ = [− ln X ± βσ 2(T − T o)]/σ√T − T o and γ =
(− ln X + [r − q + (θ − 1
2
)σ 2](T − T o ))/σ√T − T o.
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o; T, X ) f̂ (z, T o; S, t) dz
= X
b−β+1Sβ−b
β − b − θ 2
(
d+X , −do+X , −ρ
) − Xb+β+1S−β−b
b + β + θ 2
(
d−X , −do−X , −ρ
)
(A16)











T − t, −ho−S/X − θ
√
T o − t, −ρ)
where ρ ≡
√
(T o − t)/(T − t).
The value of the unrestricted reload option with vesting at time T o is the sum of
(A12), (A13), and (A16).




β − b − θ 2
(
d+X , −do+X , −ρ
) − Xb+β+1S−β−b
b + β + θ 2
(
d−X , −do−X , −ρ
)
+ Se−q(T o−t)(ho+S/X)[1 + θ Rθ (1, T o; T, 1)]
− Xe−r (T o−t)(ho−S/X)[1 − (1 − θ )Rθ (1, T o; T, 1)] (A17)











T − t,− ho−S/X − θ
√
T o − t, −ρ).
This formula is (13) in the text.
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